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Evidence suggests that rank-based performance 
feedback (RBPF) can influence workplace 
performance. Still, knowledge about the differential 
effects of RBPF on two central antecedents of 
employees’ performance — perceived pressure and 
individual goal-setting — is still sparse. We address 
these gaps by using a survey-based study and found 
that the effects of RBPF on individual goal-setting are 
positive for high, intermediate, and low performing 
individuals. However, these positive effects come with 
a price: Low performers who find themselves at the 
bottom of the ranking perceive their situation as more 
pressuring compared to a situation without ranking. 
Although these results point to a potential benefit, they 
also cast doubt on the implementation of rankings 
within the workplace. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Companies are interested in increasing the 
workplace performance of their employees. Receiving 
feedback is commonly accepted as an important driver 
of employees’ workplace performance [1, 2, 3, 4]. As a 
result, different kinds of IS-enabled feedback regimes 
have been implemented in a number of organizations. 
Due to the recent trend towards implementing 
gamification techniques such as leaderboards into the 
workplace, rank-based performance feedback (RBPF) 
regimes — which provide social standards against 
which individual performance is gauged — have now 
become especially popular [5, 6].  
Recent evidence suggests that RBPF can positively 
influence workplace performance [1, 7, 8, 9]. More 
specifically, one channel having performance 
enhancing effects is that RBPF can lead to an increase 
in individuals’ goal-setting by (1) allowing to identify 
with successful targets, and (2) reducing uncertainty 
about the true status of one’s ability and possibly 
attainable performance levels [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. 
However, research also suggests that the introduction 
of RBPF into the workplace may have detrimental 
effects on workplace performance: Feedback regimes 
can create an excessively competitive and pressuring 
workplace due to employees’ constant strive for better 
ranks (e.g., [16, 17]).  
Still, one central aspect of RBPF has not yet been 
the focus of intense research in workplace settings. 
More specifically, the influence of individuals’ ranking 
positions on perceived pressure has been largely 
neglected, although there are good arguments for the 
pressuring effect of RBPF potentially varying a great 
deal across the performance distribution of a ranking: 
Indeed, studies have shown that in upward 
comparisons (i.e., comparisons to others that are better-
off), which are typical in the case of low performers, 
individuals are made aware of their lack of skill, status, 
or position, which increases their perceived stress [16]. 
In contrast, downward comparisons (i.e., comparisons 
to others that are worse-off), which are typical in the 
case of high performers, are capable of reducing stress 
states [18, 19]. As a result, we expect that introducing 
RBPF into the workplace (a) increases perceived 
pressure for low and intermediate performing 
individuals, and (b) decreases perceived pressure for 
high performing individuals.  
Similarly, no study that we know of has examined 
how people respond to their ranking position in terms 
of their individual goal-setting. As a result, we also 
analyze RBPF’s influence on (c) individual goal-
setting across the performance distribution of a 
ranking.  
In order to evaluate the influence of RBPF on 
perceived pressure and individual goal-setting across 
the performance distribution, we conducted a factorial 
survey with 416 respondents and a repeated-measures 
between-subjects design with three treatment groups: 
low performers (Group 1), intermediate performers 
(Group 2), and high performers (Group 3). The 
baseline condition provided our subjects with a 
criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF) that 
allowed them to compare their performance to a 
predefined performance level. Following this, subjects 
had to answer a questionnaire on perceived pressure 





and had to set an individual goal for their future 
performance. Respondents then received a vignette that 
provided RBPF, which allowed for social comparison 
by placing the low performers at the bottom rank, 
intermediate performers at the middle rank, and high 
performers at the top rank. Finally, subjects had to 
once again answer the questionnaire and indicate a 
performance goal.  
 
2. Rank-based performance feedback 
 
Providing feedback is essential to foster workplace 
performance and guide employees’ efforts to meeting 
an organization’s objectives. Feedback is defined as 
“information about the gap between the actual level 
and the reference level of a system parameter which is 
used to alter the gap in some way” [20, p. 4].  
In many cases, providing feedback entails 
presenting information to employees about their 
progress towards attaining predefined goals — thus 
allowing them to compare their actual performance to a 
given reference level [21]. In educational psychology, 
this type of feedback is also referred to as criterion-
based assessment or feedback (CBPF) in which an 
individual’s absolute performance is evaluated against 
a predefined scale [22, 23]. Usually, this type of 
feedback regime relies on feedback being given 
privately. As a result, comparisons to an absolute level 
allow for competition, but only with one’s self [24]. 
Another frequently-used type of feedback is 
relative performance feedback, which allows for the 
interpersonal comparison of one’s progress, abilities, 
or work outcomes to social reference levels [21]. More 
specifically, an individual’s performance is assessed in 
relation to other individuals based on their relative 
performance [22, 23]. In particular, relative 
performance feedback often relies on publicly-
announced performance rankings (e.g., inside a 
company’s intranet). This so-called rank-based 
performance feedback (RBPF) allows for social 
comparison and, as a result, also allows employees to 
compete with each other.  
Studies have shown that RBPF can influence 
workplace performance through some of its main 
antecedents. More specifically, RBPF reveals people’s 
social ranking, which can influence an individuals’ 
goal-setting. This, in turn, can drive workplace 
performance [3, 12, 21, 25]. At the same time, RBPF 
can also be demoralizing and create an excessively 
competitive and pressurizing workplace, which can 
negatively affect workplace performance [16]. In 
summary, RBPF is commonly accepted as an 
important (indirect) driver of workplace performance 
through individual goal-setting and perceived pressure. 
However, we believe that the effects generated by 
RBPF may well vary for subjects at different positions 
within a performance distribution. In other words, we 
believe that the introduction of RBPF has a different 
impact on the main antecedents of workplace 
performance, depending on the individual’s rank. Thus, 
in the following sections, we will build hypotheses 
regarding the influence of RBPF on perceived pressure 
and individual goal-setting according to an individual’s 
position in the performance distribution. 
 
3. Research model 
 
3.1 Perceived pressure 
 
Perceived pressure is commonly defined as the 
perceived presence of situational incentives for 
optimal, maximal, or superior performance [26]. It is 
different from the active pressure-exerting behavior of 
peers, colleagues or supervisors. Indeed, perceived 
pressure is rather an inherent passive feeling that 
people experience as a reaction to specific situations, 
such as working in a competitive environment.  
According to the theory of social comparison 
processes [27], people have an inherent desire to 
compare themselves to others in order to relate their 
own features (abilities and opinions) to those of 
relevant peers. Moreover, they deeply care about their 
relative performance ranks. It is widely acknowledged 
that social comparisons lead to competition, as 
comparing to others either makes individuals aware of 
their lack of skill, status or position, or of their success 
[16]. Competition can be defined as situations in which 
individuals’ outcomes are opposed and the gain of one 
comes at the loss of the other [28]. This means that 
individuals’ goal attainments are negatively correlated 
with each other: A better performance and, hence, a 
higher social status for one subject is always linked to 
a lower performance and, hence, a lower social status 
for other subjects [29]. As a result, competitions can be 
perceived as pressuring, as users might feel they need 
to constantly perform better than others.  
Studies have shown that the urge to perform better 
and better can have detrimental effects on 
performance. This is commonly referred to as choking 
under pressure [26] and describes performance 
decrements in situations in which good or improved 
performance is especially important. Moreover, 
pressure can also be counterproductive when 
cooperation is important - for instance, if it encourages 
workers to behave unfairly and to sabotage each other 
[30, 31, 32]. As a result, it is important for employers 
to know the antecedents of perceived pressure so that 
they can, if necessary, prevent it from emerging.  
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RBPF allows individuals to compare themselves to 
others since the information on social entities 
(including oneself) is set in relation to others. 
Introducing RBPF into the workplace can thus be 
expected to influence employees’ perceived pressure 
levels due to their constant striving for better ranks. 
Research on perceived pressure as an outcome of 
RBPF is sparse. [33] found no significant evidence that 
rankings lead to increased feelings of situational 
pressure while [17] found pressuring effects in 
gamified working situations based on intensified social 
comparison processes. However, both studies do not 
investigate individual ranking positions. We believe 
that the pressuring effect of RBPF may vary across the 
performance distribution.  
More specifically, RBPF offers opportunities for 
both downward comparisons and upward comparisons, 
depending on individuals’ position within the ranking. 
Whereas upward comparison refers to individuals’ 
comparison to better-off individuals, downward 
comparison describes individuals’ comparison to 
worse-off individuals [34]. In the literature on social 
comparison, studies have shown that downward 
comparisons, which are typical for high performers, 
can reduce stress states [18, 19]. In contrast, when 
individuals make upward comparisons, which is typical 
for low performers, they are made aware of their lack 
of skill, status, or position, which increases their 
perceived stress. In particular, if subjects perceive their 
upward targets to be threatening [35], upward 
comparisons are perceived to be ego-deflating and 
stressful. In line with this, [29] and [16] showed that 
low performers are put under intense pressure to 
exhibit competitive behaviors.  
Based on these theoretical insights regarding social 
comparison processes, we hypothesize that the effects 
of introducing RBPF into the workplace might well 
differ for subjects in different positions within the 
performance distribution. More specifically, we 
postulate that the introduction of RBPF decreases the 
perceived pressure of high performing individuals at 
the top of the ranking and increases the perceived 
pressure of low and intermediate performing 
individuals at the bottom and in the middle of ranking, 
respectively. Indeed, only high performers are in a 
position that solely allows for downward comparisons. 
In contrast, both the low and intermediate performers 
are placed in a situation where they are made aware of 
their shortfalls, and are, thus, put under intense 
pressure. We hypothesize that: 
 
Introducing rank-based performance feedback into the 
workplace  
(H1a) increases perceived pressure for low 
performing individuals. 
(H1b) increases perceived pressure for 
intermediate performing individuals. 
(H1c) decreases perceived pressure for high 
performing individuals. 
 
3.2 Individual goal-setting 
 
Individuals draw inferences about their capabilities 
via social comparisons, especially when they are 
uncertain about their abilities [36]. Since RBPF 
provides social comparison information, it is a useful 
source to form individual goals and to consequently 
adjust performance levels. In addition, research 
indicates that individuals may not only respond to such 
comparisons by attempting to adjust performance to 
match their goals — indeed, they may also revise their 
goals in light of their performance [37], providing a 
further avenue through which individual goal-setting 
can increase performance. As such, individual goals 
are not static entities — rather, individuals frequently 
revise their personal performance standards up and 
down often as a reaction to being confronted with 
feedback.  
Empirical research has found individual goal-
setting to have positive effects on self-regulatory 
processes and outcomes such as effort, and persistence, 
which in turn drive workplace performance (e.g., [37, 
38, 39]. As a result, it is especially important for 
employers to understand how individual goal-setting is 
shaped by feedback interventions in order to support 
workplace performance in the end.  
On the whole, goals play an important role in 
RBPF. Indeed, an inherent feature of the RBPF is that 
it makes performance more salient, subsequently 
allowing individuals to form individual performance 
goals. This means of creating goals through RBPF 
deviates from traditional workplace situations. Indeed, 
whereas in traditional workplaces the individual goals 
of the workers are created by the supervisors, in 
ranking situations, the goals are created by the workers 
themselves [40].  
Uncertainty concerning the relative status of one’s 
performance is an essential component that impedes 
the upward goal revision and subsequent effort 
enhancements. Since RBPF reduces individuals’ 
uncertainty about their status and leverages social 
information about their capabilities, we believe that 
RPBF can lead to upward goal revisions. We believe 
this to be especially true in the case of downward 
comparisons: In these cases, subjects experience the 
success of outperforming others, thus increasing their 
perceived individual goal-setting. As a result, they may 
raise their self-set performance goals and thus 
positively influence their performance [37]. However, 
we suspect that this positive effect should hold true 
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across the entire performance distribution, and not just 
for high and intermediate performers. This means that 
low performing individuals could also experience these 
positive effects, as long as reaching a social standard 
(that is, a higher rank) is perceived as attainable [38, 
39]. The ranking could also provide important 
information to the low-performing individuals: First, 
observing others who are proficient at a task can reveal 
useful information about how to improve oneself [41]. 
Second, individuals may come to identify themselves 
with successful targets and perceive them as role 
models, and leading to the imitation of the target’s 
actions [42]. Third, seeing others succeed may propel 
people to set higher personal standards, which can 
motivate efforts towards these new and higher goals 
[15]. We hypothesize that: 
 
Introducing rank-based performance feedback into the 
workplace increases individual goal-setting for 
(H2a) low performing individuals. 
(H2b) intermediate performing individuals. 
(H2c) high performing individuals. 
 
4. Research design 
 
4.1 Factorial survey 
 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a factorial 
survey (also called vignette study) [43]. Vignettes are 
“short, carefully constructed description[s] of a person, 
object, or situation, representing a systematic 
combination of [the investigation-relevant] 
characteristics” [44, p. 128]. Respondents are then 
confronted with these different fictional situation 
descriptions and asked to assess them on the basis of a 
questionnaire. The situation descriptions may consist 
of a situational textual description, a video, 
illustrations, or any other form of stimulation.  
In our context, we asked our respondents to 
imagine that they were a call center agent:  
“Please imagine the following situation: Your 
name is B. Smith and you are working as an agent in a 
call center. Your job is to gather data for market 
research in the food industry. You are working in an 
open space office with 29 other call center agents. This 
is what you see on your intranet:”  
We then differentiated between three conditions by 
giving a different performance level (high, 
intermediate, low) to each group. More specifically, 
the criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF) 
provided to each group was either below the reference 
level (low performers), at the reference level 
(intermediate performers), or above the reference level 
(high performers). Overall, we defined a performance 
of 160/200/240 calls as being below the reference 
level/at the reference level/above the reference level, 
which corresponds to respectively 40/50/60 percent of 
the 400 target calls. All respondents were randomly 
assigned to one of the three performance groups. 
Following the introductory text, the vignettes further 
explained:  
“The performance goal of 400 calls per agent has 
not been met for several months. Hence, you and your 
colleagues were asked to put more effort into reaching 
this goal. Your payment does not depend on your 
individual performance1.”  
 
The subsequent questionnaire included items that 
measured participants’ perceived pressure. These items 
were taken from a well-tested measurement 
instrument: the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory’s 
pressure/tension subscale [45]. The three items were 
measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
Furthermore, we asked the respondents to set a goal 
with regards to the number of calls they trusted 
themselves to reach that month:  
“Based on the performance feedback you saw, 
please fill in the number of calls you trust yourself to 
reach in total by the end of the month. There is no right 
or wrong answer. Fill in the number of calls which is 
realistic for you.”. 
This allowed us to infer individual goal-setting 
which was operationalized as the difference between 
the individuals’ self-set performance targets and the 
externally predefined goal of 200 calls after half a 
month2. 
To make sure that the priming was successful, 
subjects had to recall the vignette situation after 
answering a few of the questions in the questionnaire. 
For example, we asked them what their name and job 
was in the vignette. If the subjects were unable to 
answer these questions correctly, we repeated the 
priming by presenting the vignette once again.  
Furthermore, we gathered data on subjects’ social 
comparison orientation and performance orientations 
because research has shown that these covariates are 
important determinants of people’s reactions to 
 
1 We excluded any monetary aspect of tournaments and rankings in 
order to (1) make a distinction to a related strand of research in the 
field of economics that deals with the design of optimal labor 
contracts and tournament incentive [52], and (2) to focus on the 
consequences of social comparison processes and the pursuit of 
social status in the absence of monetary incentives. This allowed us 
to capture the non-pecuniary motivational and pressuring effects of 
rank-based performance feedback. 
2 This individual goal-setting measure is highly related to the 
vignette situation since participants have to incorporate the ability of 
the vignette character in order to provide a realistic goal. Hence, we 
assumed that this particular operationalization would provide a more 
accurate measure for individual goal-setting than questionnaire items 
would provide in our vignette study. 
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rankings [36, 46, 47]: People indeed differ in their 
tendencies to engage in social comparisons, and social 
comparison orientation is a trait that reflects these 
individual differences [47] . Individuals who show a 
high level of social comparison orientation have a 
sensitivity to and awareness of others. Thus, for those 
individuals, the effects of providing social comparison 
information, such as through RBPF, are likely to be 
intensified. Furthermore, individuals may have (a) a 
desire for success because they perceive achievement 
settings such as games and competitions to be 
challenging (called performance orientation-approach); 
or they may have (b) a desire to avoid failure because 
they perceive competitions as being potentially 
threatening (called performance orientation-avoidance) 
[46]. Hence, the effects of RPBF can also be 
influenced by the individuals’ performance 
orientations. Table 1 presents our measurements.  
Table 1. Measures, items’ loadings (t-values) 
 PP AP AV SC 
PP1 The performance target makes me feel nervous.  
.845 
(27.1) -.103 .193 .052 
PP2 I feel put under pressure by the performance feedback.  
.815 
(17.7) -.026 .110 .039 
PP3 I find working toward my goals to be very stressful.  
.905 
(44.2) -.107 .272 .071 
AP1 In games and competitions, I always strive to win. -.118 
.915 
(70.8) -.350 .410 
AP2 I always want to be the first in games and competitions. -.080 
.941 
(162.6) -.352 .538 
AV1 In games and competitions, I only try to avoid doing poorly. .252 -.128 
.681 
(8.7) .098 





For me, success means to be better than 





I am very much looking at how well I 
perform in comparison to my colleagues. .072 .415 -.022 
.901 
(54.1) 
Note: PP = Perceived pressure; AP = Performance orientation-approach; 
AV = Performance orientation-avoidance; SCO = Social comparison 
orientation. 
 
After answering the questionnaire, we introduced a 
RBPF into the vignette situation by means of a 
leaderboard. Whereas our respondents up until then 
only had information about their individual 
performance, they now also had knowledge about their 
peers, enabling them to compare themselves with 
others through this relative performance feedback. The 
continued vignette description read as follows: 
“After half a month has passed, the average 
number of calls did not change by much. For this 
reason, your boss wants to give you better feedback to 
reach the desired calls for the month. To reach the 
performance goal more frequently, the performance 
feedback feature in your intranet was updated. In 
addition to individual performance feedback, there is 
also a ranking list to give you and your colleagues 
comparison feedback. The feedback refers to your 
performance after 15 days of the current month, so you 
still have 15 days to reach your goal of 400 calls. Your 
payment still does not depend on your individual 
performance and/or ranking position.” 
Following this, the leaderboard was presented to 
the respondents. Respondents that previously 
performed below the reference level, met the reference 
level, or performed above the reference level were 
shown a ranking of 1/15/30 respectively (i.e., the 
first/middle/last position on the leaderboard3).  
 
In the final step, all participants had to yet again 
answer the questionnaire described above, in addition 
to a few demographic questions.  
 
In summary, our vignette study consisted of three 
groups that were first given criterion-based 
performance feedback (CBPF) with no information 
about their peers (t0). Their position in the 
performance distribution was either below the 
reference level, at the reference level, or above the 
criterion-based reference level (Groups 1, 2, and 3). 
Each respondent then had to answer items for our 
perceived pressure measure and, in addition, had to 
indicate a personal goal to measure their individual 
goal-setting. Following this, the respondents again 
received performance feedback, though this time, in t1, 
it was relative performance feedback provided by a 
ranking (RBPF). Finally, the respondents yet again 
answered the questionnaire. Overall, this research 
design enabled us to: (1) evaluate the influences of 
performance transparency on each of our dependent 
variables (within-subject) through the use of a ranking; 
and (2) analyze whether these effects differed for 
different positions in the performance distribution 
(low, intermediate, high; between-subject). 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
In January 2018, we recruited English-speaking 
respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk over a 
period of two weeks. More specifically, speaking 
English was an obligatory qualification for 
participation in the study, and we promised a reward of 
1 $ per questionnaire. In this manner, we obtained 732 
online questionnaires. However, we had to drop several 
datasets from our sample: First, we dropped 216 
datasets where the respondents repeatedly answered 
our priming-control questions incorrectly. 
 
3 The performance level itself did not change per respondent. For 
example, respondents that performed below the reference level / had 
met the reference level / performed above the reference level in the 
criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF), also received a 
bottom / middle / top rank in the rank-based performance feedback 
(RBPF). Thus, the RBPF confirmed the CBPF, respectively.  
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Furthermore, we dropped 39 datasets that were 
answered very quickly by the respondents (less than 6 
minutes, which was equal to the average time to 
complete the questionnaire minus the standard 
deviation). Finally, we dropped certain datasets due to 
an obvious/invalid answer scheme (identified through 
reversed questions and the open question on the 
personal goal).  
As a result, we had a final sample size of 416 
respondents. Our sample consisted of 50.7% male 
respondents with a mean age of 36.6 (SD = 12.28). 
Nearly 60% of our respondents indicated that they 
were currently employed. According to the results of 
the Kruskal-Wallis tests, one-way Analyses of 
Variance (ANOVA) and Pearson’s Chi-Square tests, 
no significant difference was detected across 
treatments in gender, age, current profession, social 
comparison orientations, or performance orientations. 
This suggests a successful random assignment of 
subjects to our treatment groups and supports the claim 
that the treatment groups did not differ with regards to 
these important covariates. This means we could rule 
out structural group differences as being the cause of 
any differences found in our dependent variables 




5.1 Measurement model 
 
To evaluate our measurement model, we performed 
a confirmatory factor analysis in t0 for our Likert-type 
scales via SmartPLS 3.2.4 [48]5. To test for 
significance, we used the integrated bootstrap routine 
with 5,000 samples [49].  
 
Tables 2 and 1 present the correlation between 
constructs together with the Average-Variance-
Extracted (AVE) and Composite-Reliability (CR), and 
our items’ factor loadings, respectively: AVE and CR 
were at least .674 and .801, respectively, meeting the 
suggested construct reliability thresholds of .50 and .70 
[50]. All items but one (AV1: λ=.681, p<.001) loaded 
high (at least .815) and significant (p<.001) on their 
parent factor and, hence, met the suggested threshold 
of indicator reliability of .70 [50]. Nevertheless, we 
kept AV1 in our measurement model: “[I]ndicators 
with loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 should only be 
 
4 The demographics of our final sample as well as the results of the 
randomization check are available on request from the authors. 
5 Another confirmatory factor analysis was performed in t1 and came 
to the same conclusions regarding construct reliability, indicator 
reliability, and discriminant validity as the one performed in t0. The 
detailed results can be requested from the authors.  
considered for removal from the scale if deleting this 
indicator leads to an increase in composite reliability 
above the suggested threshold value” [49, p. 145] 
which was not the case in our analysis since all CRs 
already met their suggested threshold as indicated 
above. We thus kept all the indicators initially used. 
Finally, the loadings from our indicators were highest 
for each parent factor and the square roots of the AVE 
of all constructs were larger than the absolute value of 
the constructs’ correlation with each other, thus 
indicating discriminant validity. 
Table 2. Correlation between constructs, AVE, 
CR 
 PP AP AV SCO 
Perceived Pressure (PP) .733 (.891)    
Performance Orientation-
Approach (AP) -.105 
.861 
(.925)   
Performance Orientation-




Orientation (SCO) .067 .516 -.082 
.850 
(.919) 
Note: Diagonal elements are the AVEs with the CRs in parentheses; off-
diagonal elements are the inter-construct correlations. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses testing 
 
Our focus lies on identifying the effects of RBPF 
for individuals in different positions of the 
performance distribution. Table 3 presents the means 
and standard deviations of our outcomes as a function 
of the feedback regime (No RBPF vs. RBPF) and the 
individual’s performance group (low, intermediate, 
high).  
 
Table 3. Descriptives 
  
No Rank-Based 
Performance Feedback, t = 
0 (NoRBPF) 
Mean (St. Dev.) 
Rank-Based Performance 
Feedback, t = 1 (RBPF) 
Mean (St. Dev.) 
 Range Group 1  Low 
Group 2  
Intermed. 
Group 3  
High 
Group 1  
Low 
Group 2  
Intermed. 
Group 3  
High 
Perceived 





























Note: *=composite score per construct, normalized with item count (=3) 
 
First, we took a look at the means of our dependent 
variables and observed multiple things. (1) Concerning 
perceived pressure, we observed differing effects of the 
provision of RBPF in the different performance 
groups: For the subjects at the bottom of the ranking 
(low performers), perceived pressure increased 
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(ΔLow = .43). In contrast, for the subjects at the top of 
the ranking (high performers), the situation was 
perceived as less pressurizing (ΔHigh = - .70). Similarly, 
middle-ranked subjects (intermediate performers) also 
reported a lower level of perceived pressure. However, 
the measured decrease was quite small (ΔIntermed. = -
 .03). (2) Concerning individual goal-setting, we saw 
an increase across all treatment groups. All subjects 
revised their goals upwards after being presented the 
RBPF. However, the increase for bottom ranked 
performers appeared to be the largest: While middle 
and top ranked individuals increased their self-set goals 
on average by 7.07 and 8.27 calls, respectively, 
subjects in the bottom performance group increased 
their goals by an average of 17.42 calls, which 
corresponds to an increase of five percentage points.  
After this initial examination of our outcomes, we 
statistically tested for the significance of the observed 
differences within our three treatment groups. Both the 
assessment of QQ-Plots as well as the results of 
Shapiro-Wilk tests proved that the data for our two 
outcomes were non-normally distributed for both the 
NoRBPF and the RBPF situation. Thus, we turned to 
non-parametric two-sided paired Wilcoxon tests for 
our analysis. The results are displayed in Table 4 (*** 
= p < .001, ** = p < .01, ns = non-significant).  
 
Table 4. Intra-group analysis - results of 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests 
Outcome Group MdnNoRBPF MdnRBPF Z p r6 
Perceived 
Pressure  
Group 1 Low 5.00 5.50 - 5.755 .000*** .724 
Group 2 Intermed. 4.75 4.75 - .326 .744ns - 
 




Group 1 Low - 50.00 - 30.00 - 4.812 .000*** .594 
Group 2 Intermed. 0.00 0.00 - 4.047 .000*** .472 
Group 3 High 50.00 60.00 - 2.963 .003** .393 
 
We found that providing RBPF had significant 
influences with large effect sizes on the perceived 
pressure of bottom ranked individuals (ZPressureLow = -
5.755, pPressureLow < .001, rPressureLow = .724) and top 
ranked individuals (ZPressureHigh = -6.300, pPressureHigh < 
.001, rPressureHigh = .899). More specifically, RBPF 
significantly increased pressure for low performers and 
significantly decreased it for high performers. In 
contrast, providing RBPF had no significant effect on 
the perceived pressure of intermediate performers 
(ZPressureIntermed. = -.326, pPressureIntermed. = .744). We thus 
rejected hypothesis H1b, and accepted hypotheses H1a 
and H1c. These findings suggest that RBPF indeed 
 
6 Effect sizes (r) of .10/.30/.50 are considered to be 
small/medium/large [53]. 
affects only the perceived pressure of subjects at the 
top or bottom of a ranking. More precisely, with 
regards to perceived pressure, the introduction of 
RBPF is only beneficial for individuals that rank high 
(they perceive less pressure). For low performers who 
rank at the bottom, the effect of using RBPF is actually 
negative since they perceive higher pressure.  
Furthermore, we found that providing RBPF had 
significant influences with large and medium effect 
sizes, respectively, on the individual goal-setting of 
individuals in all three groups, i.e., bottom-ranked 
individuals (ZGoal-SettingLow = -4.812, pGoal-SettingLow < 
.001, rGoal-SettingLow = .594), middle-ranked individuals 
(ZGoal-SettingIntermed. = -4.047, pGoal-SettingIntermed. < .001, 
rGoal-SettingIntermed. = .472), and top-ranked individuals 
(ZGoal-SettingHigh = -2.963, pGoal-SettingHigh < .01, rGoal-
SettingHigh = .393). More specifically, RBPF significantly 
increased goal-setting for all individuals, that is, for all 
low, intermediate, and high performers. We thus 
accepted hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. These 
findings suggest that RBPF does increase the goal-
setting of all subjects, independently of their position 
in the ranking. In other words, with regards to goal-
setting, the introduction of RBPF may be beneficial to 
all users, regardless of their performance level and 
individual rank.  
In conclusion, providing RBPF has different effects 
on subjects with different positions in the performance 
distribution. More specifically, RBPF is not 
unconditionally beneficial to all subjects within the 
performance distribution. Indeed, besides the positive 
effect on individual goalsetting, being compared to 
others simultaneously leads to higher perceived 




Feedback can either be given by comparing 
subjects to a predefined external standard (criterion-
based performance feedback, CBPF), or by relative 
performance feedback that enables interpersonal 
comparison, for example, in the form of rankings 
(RBPF). Recent evidence shows that people are 
interested in their (social) rank and that the human 
preference for high ranks in general increases subjects’ 
performance, effort, and motivation [4, 5, 7, 8, 51]. 
However, rankings may create different feedback 
situations at the individual level. This is why recent 
research has turned to ranking effects and its 
consequences on individual behaviors and affections. 
Our paper contributes to the recent literature by 
examining RBPF’s effects on perceived pressure and 
individual goal-setting, which are important drivers of 
workplace performance. First, we showed that an 
individual’s performance level (high, intermediate, 
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low) and their resulting ranking position (top, middle, 
bottom) strongly determines how they react to the 
provision of ranking feedback with regards to 
perceived pressure. Second, we showed that RBPF 
increases goal-setting for individuals of all ranking 
positions. Most notably, the effect on individual goal-
setting is largest for bottom-ranked individuals.  
More specifically, our results suggest that the 
effects of RBPF on perceived pressure strongly depend 
on an individual’s position in the performance 
distribution. Introducing RBPF appears to reinforce the 
already existing variations of perceived pressure at 
different positions in the performance distribution. We 
already observed the highest scores of perceived 
pressure for the low performers who fell below a given 
reference level in CBPF. This insight is in line with 
other research results proving that receiving negative 
feedback (forced upward comparison) has negative 
effects on affections, e.g. leading to frustration and 
ego-deflation. By allowing low performers to compare 
themselves to others, pressure is greatly increased: 
Indeed, we found a steep increase in perceived pressure 
among low performers. Being compared to others 
makes them aware of their lack of skill, status, or 
position relative to their colleagues. In contrast, we 
found that high performers perceive the ranking 
situation as less pressuring. The downward 
comparisons reassure these individuals of their 
superiority, which subsequently reduces the stress of 
getting feedback and has soothing effects. Taken 
together, we conclude that providing ranking 
information has distinct effects on perceived pressure 
for individuals with differing performance levels, and 
that because of this, care should be taken when RBPF 
is introduced in the workplace.  
In parallel to this, our results hint to the fact that the 
provision of RBPF can indeed be a useful tool to foster 
workplace performance. We found that after a ranking 
is introduced, low, intermediate, and high performers 
revise their self-set performance goals upwards. These 
overall positive ramifications across all three tested 
performance groups may be driven by several effects. 
First, introducing RBPF reduces performance 
ambiguity for all groups, which has been shown to be 
an important condition to developing realistic 
individual goals. In other words, receiving timely and 
accurate feedback that compares oneself to others 
reduces uncertainty about the true status of one’s 
performance. In addition to this, providing ranking 
information also reduces the uncertainty of whether the 
externally provided goal is attainable. This is 
especially the case for low performers since the 
feedback reveals that others are proficient at the task, 
which can lead low performers to improve by 
observing high performers. Second, for high 
performers, the comparison with “worse-off” others 
serves the goal of self-enhancement, leveraging 
individuals’ self-esteem and belief that they can further 
outperform others. The same holds true for middle-
ranked subjects, since they get confirmation that they 
are capable of fulfilling requirements. Third, with 
regards to low performers, we found that the forced 
upward social comparison is seen as indicating a large 
potential for personal improvement. As such, RBPF 




Our study has some limitations. First, the situation 
described in our vignette can never be fully realistic 
and is especially prone to individual misperceptions. In 
addition, our results might not hold true for non-
English speaking people, and differences might be 
found for other age groups. As a result, the external 
validity of our study might be limited. Although the 
scenario and the wording were carefully constructed, it 
is still possible that the respondents might have 
misinterpreted the situations. Indeed, the situation that 
was described in our fictitious scenario was not equally 
realistic for all respondents. For example, in the case of 
the students in our sample, it was maybe more difficult 
for them to place themselves in a working situation 
than it was for the employees in our sample.  
Second, our intra-group results are prone to 
sequence effects. Due to the fact that subjects had to 
answer the same questionnaire twice, the results may 
be distorted since subjects may not have been blind to 
condition in the ranking situation. In other words, the 
answers in t1 could have been influenced by the 
baseline situation in t0. However, this limitation is 
mitigated by the inter-group analysis, which proved 
significant group differences in the reactions to the 
provision of RBPF.  
Third, it is possible that our participants lacked the 
introspective ability to provide an accurate response to 
the self-reported measures, especially since they had to 
put themselves into a vignette situation. As a result, 
behavioral measures gathered in a field study would 
certainly be of value in order to confirm our results. 
Fourth, our research design is limited by presenting 
participants only with three possible ranking positions 
(top, middle, bottom), leaving out all other potential 
ranking positions as well as any potential effects driven 




Our findings hold important managerial 
implications with regards to the implementation of 
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feedback systems in organizations. While the 
introduction of rankings seems to be beneficial for 
individual goal-setting, this positive effect comes with 
a price: Low-performers who find themselves at the 
bottom of the ranking perceive their situation as more 
pressuring compared to a situation without a ranking. 
These findings raise the question of the long-term 
effects of such feedback interventions. Research has 
already shown that higher pressure can lead to 
detrimental performance effects [26], unethical 
behavior [32], lower cooperation [31] and sabotage 
[30]. In particular, if existing performance and ability 
differences between employees are further stressed by 
rankings, situations are created in which low-
performers lag far behind and reaching the social 
standard seems impossible. In this case, rankings may 
have adverse effects on performance. 
Hence, from a managerial perspective, it is 
important to mitigate the trade-off between leveraging 
self-set goals and increasing pressure for low 
performers. A possible solution might be to adjust the 
feedback regime to the performance level of 
employees. This may be especially beneficial for 
distributed teams that mainly interact via IS, since 
feedback interventions are then only minimally diluted 
by social interactions. First, it could be useful to form 
groups of employees of similar performance and ability 
in order to avoid a situation in which some individuals 
lag far behind others in the ranking. Second, adjusting 
feedback regimes to the performance groups could be 
another way of maximizing the positive effects of 
feedback provision. Indeed, RBPF regimes may be 
useful for enhancing the workplace performance of 
high performers due to their self-enhancement effects, 
but non-ranking feedback regimes such as comparison 
to the mean performance of others may be more 
suitable for low performers.  
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